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Abstract. Market pioneers can develop first-mover advantages that span decades. The most general 
first-mover advantage that helps explain higher pioneer market share levels is a broad product line or 
brand proliferation. In markets for experience goods, pioneers tend to shape consumer tastes and 
preferences in favor of the pioneering brand. While the preliminary results vary by industry, they 
indicate that market pioneers do not tend to perish more often than later entrants. Accounting profits 
for market pioneers generally are lower in the first four years of operation, but higher thereafter. 
Overall, market pioneers follow innovative strategies that have high initial costs and risks, but yield 
high potential returns. 
Key words: First-mover advantages, market share, market pioneers. 
I. Introduction 
Being the market's first entrant is generally more costly than being an early 
follower or a late entrant. The reason is that product innovation tends to be more 
costly than product imitation (Mansfield, Schwartz and Wagner, 1981; Levin et 
al., 1987). Will the first entrant's higher costs be offset by revenue gains? If so, 
innovation is encouraged, which is a key source of economic growth. 
Though the empirical evidence in economics generally supports first-entrant 
revenue gains, it is based on a few industries, such as pharmaceuticals (Bond and 
Lean, 1977; Gorecki, 1986; Hurwitz and Caves, 1988; Grabowski and Vernon, 
t992) and cigarettes (Whitten, 1979). More extensive empirical work on first- 
mover advantages comes from research in business schools. 
We survey empirical evidence of first-mover advantages from pioneering new 
markets. (Also, see Scherer and Ross, 1990, pp. 582-592.) One key research 
stream examines the impact of order of market entry on market share. The survey 
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results consistently show that market pioneers tend to maintain market share 
advantages over later entrants. For example, across broad samples of business 
units, Robinson and Fornell (1985) and Robinson (1988a) estimate the empirical 
association between order of market entry and market share. It is almost as strong 
as the empirical association between market share and profitability (Shepherd, 
1972; Ravenscraft, 1983). Note that Schmalensee (1989) classifies the association 
between market share and profitability as one of "the main empirical regularities 
that have been uncovered in inter-industry research" (p. 953). These two general 
tendencies suggest that market pioneers also tend to have higher profitability. 
How have so many pioneers maintained market share advantages for literally 
decades? We address this question as well as several others: 
• How is a market pioneer identified? 
• Can the market pioneer shape consumer tastes and preferences? 
• Are market pioneer advantages often sustained by crushing later entrants with 
aggressive reactions? 
• Do market pioneers typically start with superior skills and resources? 
• How long does it take later entrants to reach their long-term (asymptotic) share 
level? 
• How important is the pioneer's leadtime in developing sustainable market share 
advantages? 
• Do market pioneers have higher accounting profits than later entrants? 
These questions are typically addressed by examining surviving market pioneers 
and later entrants. Such research provides insights into the rewards for market 
pioneering, conditional on survival. Because market pioneering is both costly and 
risky, the survival issue is also examined. Finally, public policy implications are 
addressed. 
II. Identifying the Market Pioneer 
A fundamental consideration is how to identify the market pioneer. Though 
various definitions have been proposed (Lieberman and Montgomery, 1988), the 
market pioneer is typically defined as "the market's first entrant." Implementing 
this definition requires that (1) entrants be distinguished from firms that attempt 
to enter a new market, but fail and (2) market boundaries be established. 
To be classified as an entrant, a business should reach a competitive scale of 
commercialization. A competitive scale gives the market pioneer an opportunity 
to capture first-mover advantages. If competitive scale is not reached, a firm should 
be classified as having failed in its attempt to enter a new market. For example, 
Whitten (1979) requires that an entrant in a national cigarette market be supported 
by national advertising. Urban et at. (1986) require that an entrant in a national 
market for consumer packaged goods achieve national distribution. Hence, if a 
firm does not have national advertising or national distribution in a national 
market, it does not qualify as an entrant. 
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At what point in the market's evolution should market boundaries be deter- 
mined? Market boundaries are typically determined after customer acceptance for 
a new product has been established. The reason is that it is very difficult to assess 
the commercial potential of a dramatic innovation at the time of its introduction. 
For example, when Xerox entered the photocopying market in 1958, the commer- 
cial potential for plain-paper copying was not recognized (Washington Post, 1985). 
Even industry experts did not foresee plain-paper copying as a new market, but 
it turned out to be one because it generated many more photocopying applications. 
Plain-paper and coated-paper copying were different markets because they were 
not viewed by customers as close substitutes. That fact could not be determined in 
1958 however, and Xerox was not immediately recognized as the market pioneer. 
Once customer acceptance has been established, how should market boundaries 
be determined? Market boundaries typically reflect customer substitution in use. 
In practice, they have been based on accepted industry practice (Whitten, 1979), 
consumer evaluations of products that are close substitutes (Urban et al., 1986), 
and managers' evaluations of their company's target customers (PIMS Data Man- 
ual, 1979). As a whole, these market boundaries tend to be narrower than four- 
digit SIC codes. The general insights into market pioneer advantages described 
below are robust to these varied definitions of market boundaries. 
In contrast, Golder and Teltis (1993) identify market pioneers using historical 
analysis. This innovative approach relies on objective information from multiple 
sources at the time the market originated, thus avoiding reliance on industry 
representatives to identify the market pioneer many years after the market's 
beginning. Though industry representatives are experts, Golder and Tellis argue 
their response is often based on personal recall or on the finn's oral tradition. As 
a result, high market share firms can be misidentified as market pioneers. The 
main strength of historical analysis is that it overcomes this problem. 
One weakness of historical analysis is that it can miss the start of new markets 
that are based on dramatic innovations. For example, Golder and Tellis identify 
Xerox as a later entrant, not as a market pioneer. Also, historical analysis requires 
a great amount of time to implement. After gathering usable information from 
more than 450 articles, Golder and TeUis piesent detailed insights on only 36 mar- 
kets. 
Table I highlights the importance of these market pioneer definition issues. 
Across Golder and Tellis' 36 markets, only four market pioneers remain the 
current market leaders. Note that Golder and Tellis do not require the pioneer to 
reach a competitive scale of commercialization. Hence, their definition can identify 
a very low market share firm as a market pioneer. For example, Golder and Tellis 
identify Trommer's Red Letter as the market pioneer of light beers. Trommer's 
was introduced by Piels Brewing Company of Brooklyn New York and was only 
on the market for about six weeks. Prior to Miller Lite, Trommer's and other 
brewers of diet beers were described as "an aberration in the minds of floundering, 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A SURVEY OF EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
tional definitions, Miller Lite and seven other current market leaders in Table I 
are classified as market pioneers. This increases the total number of pioneers that 
are current market leaders from four to 12. 
In summary, historical analysis helps avoid the problem of high market share 
firms being misidentified as market pioneers. Though time consuming, historical 
analysis in conjunction with current industry insights should yield the most accurate 
market pioneer definitions. Either approach used in isolation can generate mislead- 
ing results. 
III. Industry Studies 
The pharmaceutical industry has received the most attention. Bond and Lean 
(1977) analyzed two United States ethical drug markets. After more than 10 years 
in the market, both first entrants maintained market share leadership. Hurwitz 
and Caves (1988) examined market share levels for 29 original patent holders in 
United States pharmaceutical markets. At varying numbers of years after patent 
expiration, average pioneer market share was 63%. Two years after patent expir- 
ation, the average pioneer market share was 51%. These results point to powerful 
first-mover advantages in the United States pharmaceutical industry. Gorecki 
(1986) provides similar conclusions for the Canadian pharmaceutical indus'try. 
What was the main first-mover advantage? Bond and Lean conclude the main 
advantage was physician preference for the established and familiar pioneering 
brand names. Because patent protection has numerous limitations, "trademark 
protec t ion . . ,  appears to be far more powerful than patent protection" (p. 77). 
Market share leadership was n o t  driven by the pioneer's superior product quality 
or lower prices. For example, though quality differences can arise across ethical 
drugs, the first movers in Hurwitz and Caves' sample all faced generic substitutes. 
Even so, these first movers charged an average price premium of 127%. Hurwitz 
and Caves estimate that "a 10 percent increase in the leader's price premium loses 
it only three- to four-tenths of a percentage point of market share" (p. 314). 1 
Market share leadership does n o t  appear to be driven by promotional spending. 
Bond and Lean conclude (p. vi), "the data appear to reveal that sales and pro- 
motional dominance go hand-in-hand. Nonetheless, the data also show that the 
opportunities for gaining sales via promotion are decidedly limited. Qualitative 
characteristics such as the timing of entry and therapeutic novelty appear to 
determine both the profit-maximizing level of promotion and the sales associated 
with that promotion". Though first-entrant promotional spending was relatively 
large, it was smaller than competitors' as a percentage of sales. 
When facing strong first-mover advantages, what can a later entrant do to build 
market share? Bond and Lean say "physicians can be persuaded to prescribe late- 
entering brands if those brands offer some therapeutic gain useful to a subset of 
patients" (p. 76). For Canadian provinces, Gorecki recommends certifying brands 
as therapeutically equivalent and allowing pharmacists to select a lower priced 
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brand. Hence, one approach is to offer a better product. Another is to match 
product quality, cut price, and encourage price competition. 
Whitten (1979) studied seven cigarette submarkets that started between 1913 and 
1958. In 1974, all seven pioneering brands were still in the market with an average 
market share of 51%. Though it is not clear why these pioneering brands were so 
successful, lower prices can be eliminated because price competition was rare. As 
found by Bond and Lean, first entrants' advertising spending was large, but 
relatively small as a percentage of sales. For the three pioneers that lost their 
number one rank, better flavor from later entrants contributed to their decline. 
Mascarenhas (1992) found that market pioneers had higher market shares in 
national markets for semisubmersible oil-drilling rigs. He speculates these market 
share advantages arose from pre-empting prime drilling sites and from buyer 
switching costs. 
For 58 financial innovations, Tufano (1989) reports that investment banks that 
created the financial innovations did not charge relatively high prices during their 
brief period of monopoly. After entry, prices typically remained below those of 
rival imitative products. By being first and charging prices that were no higher 
than rivals', the first movers were rewarded with a higher long-run market share. 
The financial innovators were also rewarded by an influx of new customers to 
whom they could sell additional services. 
What conclusions can be drawn from these industry studies? First-mover advan- 
tages as reflected in higher long-term market share levels are important in national 
pharmaceutical, cigarette, semisubmersible oil-drilling rig, and investment banking 
industries. The sources of these first-mover advantages are varied, but customer 
familiarity and brand loyalty are important. Overall, a market pioneer's enduring 
trademark protection is more important than patent protection. 
Later entrants who want to overtake the pioneer often give customers either a 
product or price incentive to switch brands. Lower prices can increase market 
share, but opportunities for price competition are often limited. Promotional 
spending is most effective when coordinated with a unique and meaningful product 
benefit. 
Are the market pioneer advantages unique to the industries cited or do they 
typically arise across markets? This is a key issue because later entrants can benefit 
from free-rider effects, resolution of technological and market uncertainties, 
changing technologies, changing consumer needs, and incumbent inertia (Lieber- 
man and Montgomery, 1988). Examples of market pioneers that have been quickly 
overtaken by later entrants are Reynolds International Pen (ballpoint pens), Bow- 
mar Instruments (hand-held electronic calculators), Osborne (portable computer 
market), and Royal Crown Cola (diet and caffeine-free colas). In contrast to 
industry-specific examples and counterexamples, cross-sectional research yields 
insights into general tendencies. 
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Table II. Order of market entry and market share for consumer packaged goods a 
Share relative to 
Entry order pioneering brand 
Market share forecasts (%) 
Ist  2rid 3rd 4th 5th 6th 
First 1.00 100.0 . . . . .  
Second 0.7i 58.5 41.5 . . . .  
Third 0.58 43.6 31.0 25.4 - - - 
Fourth 0.51 35.7 25.4 20.8 18.1 - - 
Fifth 0.45 30.8 21.9 17.9 15.5 13.9 - 
Sixth 0.41 27.3 19.4 15.9 13.8 12.4 11.2 
a From Urban et al. (1986, p. 654). Positioning quality and advertising spending are held constant in 
these market share forecasts. 
IV. Cross-Sectional Studies 
Urban et al. (1986) estimate the relationship between order of market entry and 
market share across consumer packaged goods. The sample includes 129 major 
brands in 36 product categories. The first and second entrant both averaged more 
than 25 years in the market. Product category examples are chewing gum, freeze- 
dried coffee, fabric softener, and furniture polish. 
Market share performance is measured by the later entrant's share relative 
to the first entrant's share. Holding positioning quality and dollar advertising 
expenditures constant, Table II shows that the nth entrant's share relative to the 
pioneer's roughly equals 1 divided by the square root of its order of entry. For 
example, the fourth entrant has roughly one half of the pioneer's share. In a 
market with four competitors, these results predict a market share of roughly 36% 
for the first entrant and roughly 18% for the fourth entrant. 
How are these pioneer share advantages maintained for literally decades? Vari- 
ous aspects of consumer buyer behavior should benefit the pioneering brand. For 
packaged goods, it is important to separate consumer trial from repeat purchase. 
Katyanaram and Urban (1992) define trial as the percentage of consumers who 
have tried the brand. Repeat purchase is the cumulative percentage of triers who 
repeat by period t. 
Trial should be higher for market pioneers than for later entrants. Schmalensee 
(1982) argues that even for identical products, the risk of an unfavorable experi- 
ence motivates rational consumers to continue buying the pioneering brand. Along 
similar lines, Hauser and Wernerfelt (1990) say, "if two brands enter the market 
with the same distribution of perceived utility, the brand that enters earlier will 
be considered more often° If it is considered more often, it should have a higher 
market share" (p. 400). Kardes et at. (1993) also find that pioneers are included 
more often in the consideration set. All of these forces should lead to greater 
consumer trial for pioneering brands. 
Repeat purchase should also be higher for pioneering brands. One reason is 
that consumers learn more about pioneering brands because of their longer time 
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on the market. Kardes and Kalyanaram (1992) conclude, "The learning advantage 
conferred to the pioneering brand translates into more extreme and confidently 
held judgments of the pioneer. Judgments held with conviction are persistent over 
time and resistant to competitors' activities. Together, these judgmental processes 
lead to long-run pioneering advantage" (p. 356). 
Another reason for higher repeat purchase is that for experience goods, tastes 
and product attribute importance actually shift toward the first entrant. Carpenter 
and Nakamoto (1989) report "order of entry affects the structure of consumer 
preferences for brands in the category, yielding pioneers a superior position and 
a substantially higher share of buyers' choices" (p. 294). Thus, for experience 
goods, the pioneering brand can shape consumer tastes along the lines of its own 
characteristics. This helps the pioneer to be recognized as the industry standard. 
Though behavioral research has not yet linked these various hypotheses to 
market share, Kalyanaram and Urban (1992) estimate the impact of order of entry 
on both trial and repeat purchase. Their consumer packaged goods sample covers 
eight first entrant and 18 later-entrant brands. Early entry increases both trial and 
repeat purchase, but the estimated trial impact is substantially larger than the 
impact on first repeat purchase (0.48 vs. 0.26). Hence, a late entrant typically 
appears to face more problems in gaining trial than in gaining repeat purchase. 
Market pioneers should also benefit from favorable distribution, which is espe- 
cially important for consumer packaged goods. In Alpert, Kamins, and Graham's 
(1992) survey of 145 resellers of supermarket products, resellers had more favor- 
able attitudes toward pioneering brands because they tend to be more effective 
at "meeting an unmet need, contributing incremental sales, generating excitement 
about going shopping, and having potential to achieve high volume" (p. 36). 
When the pioneering brand generates favorable attitudes among resellers, has 
a higher consumer trial, and higher repeat purchase, the pioneer should typically 
spend less on advertising and promotion as a percentage of sales. Favorable 
attitudes reduce the need for advertising. Higher consumer trial and repeat pur- 
chase reduce the need for promotions targeted to consumers, such as coupons. 
These forces should also help reduce promotions targeted to retailers, such as 
discounts to gain favorable shelf space. 
Across established consumer goods businesses, Buzzell and Farris (1977) con- 
clude that "the combination of early entry and high market share almost certainly 
leads to lower marketing costs" as a percentage of sales (p. 136). Fornell, Robin- 
son, and Wernerfelt (1985) reach a similar conclusion. Thus, market pioneers, 
and especially ones that have maintained a high market share, tend to have lower 
advertising and promotional costs as a percentage of sales. 
Given these pioneering advantages, how can a late entrant catch the pioneer? 
One option is to increase the advertising budget. To offset the order-of-entry 
disadvantage, Urban et al. (1986) estimate the second entrant's dollar advertising 
budget should continually be 3.4 times the pioneer's budget. If the pioneer reacts 
with a budget increase, the second entrant's dollar budget must be increased even 
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Table III. Order of market entry and market share for mature consumer and industrial goods a 
Average market share 
Order of market entry Consumer Industrial 
(n = 371) (n = 1209) 
Market pioneer 29% 29% 
Early follower 17% 21% 
Late entrant 12% I5% 
R 2 18% 9% 
a From Robinson and Fornetl (1985, p. 310) and Robinson (1988a, p. 89). 
further to maintain the 3.4-to-1.0 advantage. Hence, it is unlikely that a typical 
second entrant can profitably catch the pioneer by using only heavier advertising. 
Introducing a superior product affords more opportunity. The second entrant is 
estimated to catch the pioneer if its product continually yields 36% more prefer- 
ence after consideration. 2 Though 36% does not seem out of reach, it can be 
difficult to achieve. This is because as a market matures, introducing a brand with 
a major product advantage becomes increasingly difficult (e.g., see Robinson, 
1990). 
A. CONSUMER AND INDUSTRIAL GOODS 
The cross-sectional evidence cited applies to consumer packaged brands. Is market 
pioneering important for consumer goods in general? For industrial goods? Robin- 
son and Fornell (1985) and Robinson (1988a) address these questions using the 
PIMS (Profit Impact of Market Strategies) data. 
A PIMS business sells one kind of products or services, to an identified target 
market, and faces clearly defined competitors. A market pioneer is defined as 
"one of the pioneers in first developing such products or services". A later entrant 
is either an early follower or a late entrant. An early follower entered a "still- 
growing, dynamic market". A late entrant entered a "more established market 
situation". 
Grouping businesses in three broad categories typically yields more than one 
pioneer per market. This approach increases random measurement error, which 
tends to weaken the empirical results. Even so, market pioneers in PIMS typically 
receive long-term market share rewards. Table III shows that across 371 mature 
consumer goods business, market pioneers had an average market share of 29%, 
early followers 17%, and late entrants 12%. More than 80% of these pioneers 
had been in the-market for 20 years or more. The empirical results are similar, 
though not quite as strong for pioneers in mature industrial goods markets. 
The descriptive strength of this empirical association can also be measured by 
the percentage of variation in market share explained by order of entry alone. 
Order of entry alone explains 18% of the variation in market share for consumer 
goods and 9% for industrial goods. A useful point of comparison is the empirical 
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association between market share and return on investment (ROI). In the PIMS 
sample, market share alone explains 21% of the variation in ROI for consumer 
goods and 8% for industrial goods. 3 Hence, the empirical association between 
order of entry and market share is almost as strong as the association between 
market share and ROI. 
The PIMS studies also help explain how so many pioneers maintain important 
market share advantages for long periods of time. Two important dimensions of 
a business's offerings are perceived product quality and product line breadth. 
Perceived quality is based on customer perceptions of quality. Though such infor- 
mation is subjective, managers who report perceived quality to PIMS are encour- 
aged to use input from market research, the salesforce, and distributors. Perceived 
quality equals the percentage of sales that are superior to competitors' less the 
percentage inferior. 
In both consumer and industrial markets, pioneers in the market less than 20 
years tend to have higher perceived quality. Pioneer perceived quality advantages 
could arise from proprietary experience, by defining industry standards, or from 
the consumer-learning-based advantages described previously. The pioneer prod- 
uct quality advantages deteriorate sharply after 20 years or more. 
During their initial monopoly and near-monopoly period, market pioneers have 
an opportunity to introduce numerous products for the biggest and best market 
segments. This can force later entrants to target smaller market niches with more 
focused product lines, a product line strategy consistent with brand proliferation 
models (e.g., Schmalensee, 1978). In both consumer and industrial markets, mar- 
ket pioneers tend to have broader product lines than late entrants. Product line 
advantages show limited deterioration after 20 years or more. Thus, product line 
breadth advantages tend to be more sustainable than product quality advantages. 
Because of this sustainability, pioneers often pre-empt competition by using 
rapid product line extensions. For example, when Quaker Oats introduced its 
Quaker Chewy Granola Bar, it did not introduce a single flavor but four flavors 
simultaneously. In the short run this effort strained Quaker's limited capacity, but 
in the long-run it helped the company maintain leadership of the granola snack 
category (Quaker Quarterly, 1984). 
In both PIMS samples, market pioneer advantages do not appear to be influ- 
enced directly by product patents or trade secrets. Price differences do not gen- 
erally play a key role in explaining market share. These results are similar to those 
of the industry studies described previously. In contrast to the pharmaceutical 
industry, average pioneer prices are within 2% of late-entrant prices. Pioneers 
had average total cost savings from purchasing, manufacturing, and physical distri- 
bution of roughly 1 to 2%. A portion of these cost savings helps build market 
share, but the associated market share impact is estimated to be less than one 
share point. These results are consistent with the modest importance of manufac- 
turing scale economies in United States markets (Scherer and Ross, 1990). 
Market pioneer advantages are also influenced by industry characteristics. In 
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consumer markets, pioneers tend to have higher shares when the product's pur- 
chase price is less than $10. This observation is consistent with Schmalensee's 
(1982) model of informational advantages for first movers in markets where con- 
sumers tend to buy from habit. 
In industrial markets, pioneer share levels tend to increase as the product's 
purchase price increases. When big-ticket items carry a high level of perceived 
risk, a switching-cost advantage accrues because customers tend to rely on known 
suppliers and brands. Also, if experience advantages are more important for big- 
ticket items, the market pioneer should benefit. 
Seller concentration is also associated with pioneer market share advantages. 
Using the PIMS data, Parry and Bass (1989) report higher pioneer share advan- 
tages in oligopolistic than in perfectly competitive markets. This can arise because 
entry barriers that increase concentration also give the pioneer first-mover advan- 
tages. 
B. SAMPLE HETEROGENEITY 
First-mover advantages are often conditional on various business- and industry- 
specific factors, such as firm proficiency, luck, and environmental changes.(Kerin, 
Varadarajan and Peterson, 1992). However, the cross-sectional empirical results 
combine many different product categories. Does this type of heterogeneity bias 
the empirical results? 
Kalyanaram and Wittink (1993) examine five categories of consumer packaged 
goods. Within individual categories, they find wide differences in the impact of 
order of market entry on market share. Even so, the average impact of order of 
entry on market share is more than 50% stronger when estimated within individual 
categories. This indicates that because of aggregation bias, broad cross-sectional 
regression studies tend to underestimate the true pioneer market share advantages. 
Ramaswamy et al. (1993) develop an empirical pooling approach that uses the 
data to determine relatively homogeneous groups of PIMS businesses. Market 
pioneers are more likely to serve national or international markets, whereas later 
entrants are more likely to serve regional markets. This supports the product 
proliferation observation above that market pioneers often pick off the biggest 
and best market segments for themselves. Later entrants are the most likely to 
serve customers that value product quality or sales force support. This type of 
product differentiation should help later entrants offset the modest scale economy 
cost disadvantages they face versus market pioneers. 
c. ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS 
Are the market pioneer advantages described due to the pioneer's intrinsically 
superior strength rather than to first-mover advantages? This issue was raised by 
Vanhonacker and Day (1987), Keck and Rao (1987) and more recently by Moore, 
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Boulding and Goodstein (1991). For example, Moore and his co-authors used 
Hausman's specification test to evaluate the exogenous versus the endogenous 
nature of market pioneering. Their results indicate that market pioneering is 
endogenous. 
If market pioneering is endogenous, a critical bias in the empirical results can 
arise if market pioneers are intrinsically stronger than later entrants. The bias is 
critical if long-term market pioneer advantages are based on superior skills and 
resources at the time of entry rather than on first-mover advantages. 
Though the literature predicts skill and resource differences for market pioneers, 
it does not predict intrinsic superiority for market pioneers. For example, Lieber- 
man and Montgomery (1988, p. 54) say, "Firms whose entrepreneurial vision and 
new product R&D are excellent will tend to find first-movership attractive, whereas 
firms having relative skill bases in manufacturing and marketing may not". Lamb- 
kin and Day's (1989) ecology model as well as empirical results of Lilien and Yoon 
(1990) and Robinson, Fornell, and Sullivan (1992) support differences in skill and 
resource patterns. They do not support intrinsic superiority for market pioneers. 
Kalyanaram and Urban (1993) take this research a step further by linking 
pioneer skills and resources to market share. Order of market entry is specified 
as a function of the firm's skills and resources and the maximum anticipated 
market share for the entrant. Order of market entry is then linked to market 
share. In the empirical results, the market share penalty for later entrants increases 
when entry is specified as endogenous. This result suggests that when market 
pioneering is treated as exogenous, the estimated market share rewards are too 
low. 
Are market pioneer advantages sustained by crushing later entrants with aggress- 
ive reactions? In a sample dominated by industrial goods businesses, Robinson 
(1988b) finds that the most likely product, distribution, marketing expenditure, or 
pricing reaction to entry is no reaction. For consumer packaged goods, Kalyanaram 
and Urban (1993) examine reactions to entry in terms of price, promotion expendi- 
tures, advertising expenditures, and distribution. Only the advertising expenditure 
reaction is significant. 
Across 18 pharmaceutical markets, Grabowski and Vernon (1992, p. 347) find 
that lower priced generic products challenged higher priced branded products. 
They conclude, "The pioneering firms did not attempt to deter entry through their 
pricing strategies. Rather, in most cases, the firms continued to increase their 
prices at the same rate at which existed prior to entry". Kim (1992) reports similar 
findings for branded pharmaceutical products. 4 Hence, though dramatic and news- 
worthy reactions by incumbents have crushed some entrants, research indicates 
that such cases are unusual. 
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V. Dynamic Order of Entry Issues 
The dynamic order of entry issues cover (1) markets started in the 1980s versus 
those started in previous decades, (2) how long it typically takes a later entrant 
to reach their long-term market share, (3) the importance of the pioneer's lead- 
time, (4) the impact of market age on pioneer share advantages, and (5) early 
market leaders whose market share levels are typically even higher than the market 
pioneers. 
Cross-sectional studies such as those of Urban et al. (t986) and Robinson and 
Fornell (1985) examine markets that were typically started decades ago. For 
example, 35% of the product categories in Urban et al. (1986) started prior to 
World War II, 18% started between 1944 and 1956, and 47% started between 
1960 and 1974. While the empirical results point to long-lasting pioneer market 
share advantages, do similar advantages arise in markets that started in the 1980s? 
Kalyanaram and Urban (1992) examine eight product categories of frequently 
purchased consumer goods that started in the 1980s. The categories include tartar 
control toothpaste, high-fiber cereals, wine coolers, and microwave popcorn. Their 
model predicts the first entrant in a market with six competitors to have a market 
share of 25% versus Urban et al.'s (1986) prediction of 27% (positioning quality, 
advertising spending, and time between entries are held constant.) The similarity 
of these predictions suggests that market pioneers received similar market share 
rewards in the 1980s versus earlier decades, s 
How long does it take a later entrant to reach its long-term (asymptotic) share 
level? Kalyanaram and Urban (1992, p. 243) report that by the eighth week of 
commercialization, second entrants typically had reached 89% of their long-term 
market share level. By the sixteenth week, they had reached 94%. The correspond- 
ing estimates for the fifth entrants were 98% and 99%. Thus, in the 1980s, long- 
term share levels for frequently purchased consumer brands were reached in a 
matter of weeks, not years. 
How important is the pioneer's leadtime in developing sustainable market share 
advantages? Because first entry helps a business develop sustainable competitive 
advantages, increasing the first entrant's leadtime should help strengthen those 
sustainable advantages. Hurwitz and Caves (1988) examine leadtime's importance 
across 56 drugs whose patents had expired. They estimate "another year of effec- 
tive patent life is worth roughly 1.6 percentage points of market share" (p. 314). 
Huff and Robinson (t993) estimate the impact of leadtime across 34 categories 
of consumer packaged goods. Increasing leadtime increases the market share 
penalty for later entrants. This result was found with two leadtime measures: lag 
between entries 6 (the number of years between n and n - 1 brand entry) and 
pioneer leadtime (the number of years between the nth and the first brand entry). 
The results are also supported in two different time periods: markets started prior 
to 1957 and those started between 1960 and 1974. 
How are pioneer share advantages influenced by the passing of time? The 
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passing of time should help a late entrant slowly reduce the order-of-entry and 
leadtime penalties. Such an effect is suggested by the empirical evidence in econ- 
omics on slowly declining dominant firms (Scherer and Ross, 1990, Ch. 10). 
Brown and Lattin (1993) divide the late entrant's time in the market by the 
market's age. (The market's age is the pioneer's time in the market). On the basis 
of their model estimated across consumer packaged goods, Brown and Lattin 
consider a market with three competing brands. The second brand enters five 
years after the pioneer. The third brand enters 20 years after the pioneer. When 
the market is 25 years old, the predicted market share levels are 41% for the 
pioneer, 36% for the second entrant, and 24% for the third entrant. As market 
age approaches infinity, the predicted market share levels are 36%, 33%, and 
31%. These results indicate a gradual decline in pioneer share advantages over 
time. 
Huff and Robinson (1993) also report a gradual decline in pioneer share advan- 
tages. The market share data were gathered in roughly 1983. In markets started 
prior to 1957, second entrants had eliminated the combined order-of-entry and 
leadtime penalties. Third and later entrants had reduced but not eliminated these 
penalties. In markets started from 1960 to 1974, even second entrants continued 
to be penalized, having a market share roughly 20% below the pioneer's share. 
Though market pioneers have relatively high market shares, Golder and Tellis 
(1993) provide convincing evidence that early market leaders have an even higher 
average market share. An early market leader is defined as "the firm that is the 
market share leader during the early growth phase of the product life cycle" (p. 
167). Though an early market leader can also be a market pioneer, the average 
market share level for surviving market pioneers was found to be 19% versus 30% 
for surviving early market leaders. In pre-World War II markets, the early market 
leader entered an average of 19 years after the pioneer versus five years in post- 
World War II markets. These results indicate it is not unusual for an early entrant 
to wrest first-mover advantages from the pioneer. 
VI. Market Pioneering and Accounting Profits 
Do market pioneers tend to generate greater accounting profits than later entrants? 
Though limitations of accounting profits are well known, numerous studies provide 
valuable insights into financial performance. For examples, see Ravenscraft (1983) 
and Scherer and Ross (1990). Also, because literally dozens of studies show that 
accounting profits influence stock prices (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986, Ch. 3), 
accounting profits should be positively correlated with economic profits. 
Because entry is a dynamic process, descriptive insights are provided at three 
different points in time during the entry process. Lambkin (1988) describes the 
early years of operation. 129 startup businesses provide insights during the first 
four years of operation and 187 adolescent businesses provide insights during the 
fifth through eighth years of operation. Each sample includes roughly one third 
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Table IV. Order of market entry and accounting profit a 
15 
Return on sales Return on investment 
(%) (%) 
Startup businesses 
Market pioneers -40 -23 
Early followers -13 -17 
Late entrants -16 -17 
Average -2_._~4 -19 
Adolescent businesses 
Market pioneers 11 21 
Early followers 6 18 
Late entrants 4 9 
Average ~ 1_66 
Mature consumer goods businesses 
Market pioneers 9 25 
Early followers 8 19 
Late entrants 5 16 
Average ~ 22 
Mature industrial goods businesses 
Market Pioneers 11 24 
Early followers 8 19 
Late entrants 7 15 
Average _99 2.__! 
a The results for the startup and adolescent businesses are from Lambkin (1988, p. 136). The authors 
derived the mature consumer goods and mature industrial goods results from the PIMS data. 
market pioneers, one third early followers, and one third late entrants. Table IV 
summarizes her results for both return on sales (ROS) and return on investment 
(ROI). 
Across the startup businesses, the market pioneers, early followers, and late 
entrants typically lost money. The pioneers had the worst performance, with an 
average return on sales of -40%.  Hence, though some economists speculate that 
market pioneers are profitable in the early years from monopolistic pricing, it 
appears that market and product development costs typically exceed any monopol- 
istic pricing benefits. For example, Robinson, Fornell, and Sullivan (1992) high- 
light the importance of pioneer product development costs. Intensive R&D spend- 
ing is defined as exceeding 50% of sales in the first two years of commercialization. 
Across 177 startup ventures, 50% of the first entrants and 26% of the other market 
pioneers report intensive R&D 7 versus 11% for early followers and 9% for late 
entrants. 
The adolescent businesses in Lambkin's sample are profitable. In addition, 
market pioneers had the highest average return on sales and return on investment. 
Thus, during the fifth through the eighth years of operations, the costs and risks 
associated with a market pioneering strategy apparently begin to pay off 
In the PIMS data, we provide similar descriptive statistics for mature consumer 
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(n = 593) and mature industrial goods (n = 1287) businesses. Roughly 80% of 
these businesses have been in their market for 20 years or longer. In Table IV, 
market pioneers again have higher return on sales and return on investment than 
early followers. Also, early followers have higher returns than late entrants. 
Hence, the costs and risks associated with a market pioneering strategy appear to 
yield above average returns in mature markets. 
Because of the descriptive nature of these results, the conclusions are tentative. 
With data available, why has the impact of market pioneering on accounting 
profits not been estimated in either a multiple regression equation or in a structural 
equation model? Research in this area has not gone beyond descriptive statistics 
because of (1) the relatively complicated modeling task and (2) a relatively weak 
empirical relationship. 
The modeling task is relatively complicated because many potential first-mover 
advantages influence accounting profits. This includes advantages that influence 
market share, as well as those that can influence marketing, purchasing, manufac- 
turing, and R&D costs. Moreover, recall order of entry alone explains 18% of 
the variation in market share for consumer goods and 9% for industrial goods. 
Order of entry alone in the mature consumer and industrial goods samples explains 
only 2 to 3% of the variation in return on sales and return on investment. (This 
is not shown in Table IV.) This relatively weak empirical relationship in conjunc- 
tion with numerous potential first-mover advantages makes accurate modeling 
difficult. 
VII. Do Market Pioneers Perish More Often than Later Entrants? 
The preceding results for market pioneer advantages generally pertain to survivors. 
New brands can perish in either (1) their market entry attempt or (2) after market 
entry. Though we are not aware of any direct research evidence, attempting to 
pioneer a new market should be much more difficult than attempting to be a late 
entrant. It is well known that pioneers often face daunting technological problems, 
whereas later entrants can rely on a known technology. What is less well known, 
perhaps, is that pioneers often face uncertain customer demand. The reason is 
that traditional market research techniques relying on customer responses can 
dramatically underestimate a product's sales potential. For example, President 
Rutherford B. Hayes said after making a demonstration telephone call, "That's 
an amazing invention, but who would ever want to use one of them?" (Wall Street 
Journal, 1986). Market research techniques to assess dramatic innovations are still 
in the development stage (Urban, 1992), but many established techniques can help 
later entrants forecast consumer demand (Urban and Hauser, 1993). 
After market entry, research has examined the relationship between order of 
entry and survival. On the one hand, because the first entrant initially faces the 
most demand and technological uncertainty, pioneers should face a greater risk 
of perishing in the first few years of commercialization. On the other hand, "studies 
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based on growing as well as declining industries have commonly found that smatler 
firms have higher exit probabilities" (Lieberman, 1990, p. 541). When a surviving 
pioneer has a higher market share than a surviving late entrant, this increases the 
pioneer's chance of withstanding an industry shake out. Also, Gort and Ktepper 
(1982) report that roughly 40% of a market's competitors are shaken out when 
the market matures. This finding highlights the survival risk faced by smaller firms. 
Given these conflicting forces, the net impact of order of entry on survival is an 
empirical question. 
The empirical results indicate the relationship between order of market entry 
and survival varies by industry type. Market pioneers tend to survive at least as 
long as later entrants in the pharmaceutical industry (Bond and Lean, 1977) and 
in markets for consumer packaged goods (Whitten, 1979; Urban et a l . ,  1986; 
Sullivan, 1992b). Survival rates are n o t  related to order of market entry across 39 
chemical product industries (Lieberman, 1989) and across 50 newspapers started 
in small Iowa towns (Glazer, 1985). In contrast, Mitchell (1991) finds that across 
five technical subfields of the medical diagnostic imaging industry, "the later a 
firm entered relative to other entrants, the longer it survived" (p. 95). 
One explanation for these differences is that pioneer trial and repeat-purchase 
advantages are more likely to arise for pharmaceuticals and consumer packaged 
goods than for high-technology products. While more research remains to be done 
in this area, the preliminary results indicate that market pioneers do n o t  tend to 
perish more often than later entrants. 
VIII. Public Policy Implications 
As noted by Schmalensee (1982, p. 361), even when pioneers develop sustainable 
competitive advantages this "does not seem to lead to any simple, general public 
policy prescriptions". This is because it is very difficult to determine the appropri- 
ate level of reward to motivate an optimal level of market pioneering attempts. 
Keeping this limitation in mind, five public policy implications are discussed below. 
First, sustainable pioneer advantages are typically developed in the marketplace, 
not in the patent office. Consumer behavior, reseller behavior, and the pioneer's 
broader product line often yield first-mover advantages. In contrast, important 
product patent protection is limited to a few markets, such as pharmaceuticals 
and chemicals (Scherer and Ross, 1990). Even when product patent protection is 
available, Levin et al. (1987, p. 810) report the typical effective life is five years 
or less. Thus, first-mover advantages developed in the marketplace are typically 
more general and more long-lasting than product patent protection. 
Second, the empirical results indicate that trademark protection of the pioneer's 
brand name is often important. When consumers rely on the known and familiar 
pioneering name, gaining trial can be especially difficult for later entrants. Strong 
brand names are often maintained for literally generations. For example, 19 of 
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the top 25 consumer brand names in 1923 were still market leaders in 1983 
(Advertising Age, 1983). 
Third, given the importance of pioneer market share advantages, it is clear that 
late entry is not "free and easy". Even though the difference between pioneer 
and later entrant share levels tends to narrow over time, later entrants typically 
do not catch the market pioneer. However, research results indicate that later 
entrants into consumer packaged goods markets reach more than 90% of their 
long-term market share level within 16 weeks. This rapid market feedback limits 
their downside losses and the risk associated with later entry. 
Fourth, the industry studies and cross-sectional evidence consistently show that 
market pioneers spend less as a percentage of sales on advertising and promotion. 
Thus, size and familiarity with the pioneering brand appear to generate long-term 
cost savings for society. Research has not yet estimated the degree to which these 
cost savings are passed along to consumers versus used to increase profits. 
Fifth, pioneers in consumer markets appear to have higher market shares when 
consumers buy out of habit. For example, when the product's purchase price is 
below $10, pioneers tend to have higher market shares and consumers are more 
likely to buy out of habit. Habitual purchase often arises because the product is 
relatively unimportant. If so, from society's standpoint, there is probably too 
much emphasis on developing relatively unimportant products such as toothpastes, 
deodorants, and ready-to-eat cereals. 8 Schmalensee (19'78) discusses divestiture 
and trademark licensing options for ready-to-eat cereals, but these options were 
not implemented in the FTC case. Future research should attempt to identify 
implementable solutions to channel more innovative effort toward more important 
products. 
IX. Summary and Conclusions 
The market pioneer is typically identified as the first entrant to achieve a competi- 
tive scale of operations in a new market. It is both costly and risky to attempt to 
pioneer a new market, but surviving market pioneers are often rewarded with 
sustainable first-mover advantages. Though pioneers also face first-mover disad- 
vantages, their high and persistent average market share levels indicate that the 
advantages generally outweigh the disadvantages. In addition to order of market 
entry, leadtime or the time between entries is important. Long leadtime enables 
the pioneer to develop even greater first-mover advantages. 
What are the sources of these pioneer first-mover advantages? In consumer 
markets, pioneering brands benefit from greater consumer trial and greater repeat 
purchase. For experience goods, repeat purchase is influenced by greater consumer 
learning and the pioneering brand's ability to shape consumer tastes. In both 
consumer and industrial markets, pioneers tend to have broader product lines. 
Product quality advantages are less important and less sustainable than product 
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line breadth advantages. Product patent protection, pricing, and advertising typi- 
cally do n o t  play key roles in maintaining pioneer share advantages. 
The pioneer advantages do not appear to arise because pioneers start with the 
strongest skills and resources. Though different types of entrants have different 
sets of skills and resources, the evidence does not support the hypothesis that 
market pioneers are intrinsically superior to later entrants. Long-term pioneer 
advantages are not typically sustained by crushing later entrants with aggressive 
reactions. 
How long does it take later entrants to reach their long-term market share level? 
In the 1980s, the second entrant across consumer packaged goods markets only 
took 16 weeks to reach 94% of its long-term market share. In 16 weeks, fifth 
entrants reached 99% of their long-term market share. 
Once market pioneers reach their long-term market share level, is their relatively 
high market share maintained indefinitely? Similar to the empirical insights on 
declining dominant firms, market pioneer share levels gradually deteriorate over 
time. The deterioration is gradual in the sense that even after decades in the 
market, most later entrant market share levels remain below those of the market 
pioneer. 
Do market pioneers tend to have higher or lower accounting profits? The answer 
depends on the point in time during the entry process when accounting profits are 
evaluated. Market pioneers, early followers, and late entrants all tend to lose 
money during their first four years of operations, but market pioneers have the 
greatest losses. Thus, potential monopolistic pricing advantages appear to be more 
than offset by unusually high product and market development costs. In years five 
through eight, these losses are typically turned around into profits and market 
pioneers tend to be the most profitable. Market pioneers also tend to be the most 
profitable in mature markets. These accounting profit results should be viewed with 
caution because they are descriptive relationships that have not been confirmed by 
econometric techniques across multiple databases. 
Do market pioneers perish more often than later entrants? The impact of order 
of entry on survival varies by type of industry. For pharmaceuticals, consumer 
packaged goods, chemical products, and small town newspapers, market pioneers 
typically survive at least as long as later entrants. This is not the case for medical 
imaging diagnostic devices, which are high-tech products. Overall, the preliminary 
evidence indicates that once a firm has achieved market pioneer status, its survival 
rate is generally no lower than that of later entrants. 
A. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
When a business succeeds in its attempt to pioneer a new market, the empirical 
results indicate that above-average returns are generated. Because of many de- 
mand and technological uncertainties, attempting to pioneer a new market is 
relatively risky. In addition, resolving many of these uncertainties is costly. For 
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example, intensive R&D spending is defined as exceeding 50% of sales during the 
first two years of commercialization. Across 177 startup ventures, 50% of the first 
entrant market pioneers and 26% of the other market pioneers reported intensive 
R&D spending, in contrast to 11% for early followers and 9% for late entrants. 
The attempt to be a market pioneer clearly involves high initial cost and risk, but 
also high potential returns. Hence, market pioneering can be viewed as the result 
of a rational and calculated risk-return tradeoff. 
When a potential market pioneer calculates the risk-return tradeoff, the empiri- 
cal research should help reduce the uncertainty associated with forecasting market 
share gains. This is important because the long-term market share gains are much 
more uncertain than the short-term costs and risks. 
Because some firms have stumbled into pioneering a new market, market pione- 
ering is not always based on a rational and calculated risk-return tradeoff. For 
example, when Tom Monaghan opened his first pizza outlet in Ypsilanti, Michigan, 
he did not have any plans to pioneer the national home-delivered pizza market. 
After dropping out of college, Monaghan was simply looking for a source of 
income. The National Science Foundation (1980) and Cleary (1981) provide other 
examples of the important role of serendipity in market pioneering. 
In conclusion, though much progress has been made in empirically estimating 
market pioneer advantages, many key questions remain unanswered. One impor- 
tant research need is to complement the numerous pharmaceutical and consumer 
packaged goods results with indepth studies of other markets. A second important 
research need is to determine how and when an early entrant is able to wrest first- 
mover advantages from the pioneer. This insight is important because early market 
leaders have even stronger long-term performance than market pioneers. Ad- 
ditional research is also needed on market pioneer survival and profitability. 
Profitability has been evaluated by accounting profits, but important insights could 
also be gained by using stock market valuations. Finally, to what degree is market 
pioneering based on serendipity versus a calculated risk-return tradeoff? The 
authors speculate that larger firms tend to use a calculated risk-return tradeoff, 
while smaller firms benefit more from serendipity. 
Notes 
1 Because of the 1984 Drug Price Competition Act and other factors, generic price competition has 
been more successful in recent years. See Grabowski and Vernon (1991) and Kim (1992). 
2 Considered brands are ones the consumer has tried, would consider using, or would not consider 
using. Preference is based on product characteristics and excludes availability, promotional support, 
and price. 
3 The PIMS market share and ROI relationships are consistent with those reported in Shepherd (1985, 
p. 42). 
4 It is not clear whether these price increases are short-sighted efforts to maintain profits or profit- 
maximizing increases in the price-insensitive segment. 
s Rewards in the 1980s may be somewhat lower because, as discussed below, pioneer market share 
advantages tend to deteriorate over time. Thus, the Urban et al. (1986) results from previous decades 
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are roughly equivalent, but include more deterioration than the results from markets started in the 
1980s. 
6 In four of five categories of frequently purchased consumer goods, Kalyanaram and Wittink (1993) 
report a significant impact of lag between entries on market share. 
7 This database uses a broader definition of a market pioneer than the definition recommended above. 
s An alternative view is that for products that are bought out of habit, it should be more costly to 
gain trial. This higher cost could potentially offset the benefits of higher repeat purchase. If so, then 
habitual purchase may not skew resource allocations towards relatively unimportant products. 
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